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Abstract
Do people in different countries understand and frame the principle of meritocracy 
differently? This question is the starting point for this cross-national analysis of the 
moral repertoires of meritocracy in four countries: Germany, Norway, Slovenia and 
the United Kingdom. The authors pursue a mixed methods approach, using data 
from the European Social Survey 2016 and qualitative data from group discussions. In 
these discussions, citizens openly talked about issues like inequality and social policy, 
which allows us to study their understandings and framings of meritocracy. The au-
thors show that the issue of unequal rewards does not only find different levels of sup-
port, but also that people – corresponding to the context they live in – have different 
understandings of which merits should count. The authors identify a ‘market success 
meritocracy’ in the UK, a work-centred understanding in Germany, a ‘common good 
meritocracy’ in Norway, and non-salience of this issue in Slovenia.
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1 Introduction
Meritocracy is considered as one of the core principles of modern post- 
industrial societies, in which education and skills are fundamental to the al-
location of people to social positions and for income differentials (Bell 1972). 
Though meritocracy in a strict sense – understood as stringent proportionality 
of individual inputs and rewards – might be an illusion, it is a well-entrenched 
norm (Duru-Bellat and Tenret 2012; Reynolds and Xian 2014). In contrast to 
the understanding of the word’s inventor Michael Young (1958), meritocracy 
is nowadays widely seen in a positive light, often associated with a fair and eq-
uitable system of distribution. No wonder then that it is a recurrent finding of 
research that peoples’ consent to inequality is largely determined by the belief 
that the income differences in society are “meritocratically deserved” (Cojocaru 
2014; Kluegel and Smith 1981; Larsen 2016; Mijs 2019). In this sense, meritoc-
racy can be considered as a core ideology for the legitimization of inequality. 
Given this centrality, it is important to study the different interpretations of 
meritocracy and the relation of these interpretations to national and social 
structural contexts.
The notion of merit is fairly contingent and depends on one’s view of soci-
ety (Arrow, Bowles and Durlauf 2000). The practice of rewarding merit, though 
being a central legitimizing norm in modern societies, is severely underspeci-
fied and context-dependent and may relate to very different types of ‘merits’. 
What is considered good, productive, worthy or rewardable when thinking 
about the norm of meritocracy might differ. In this article, we pose the ques-
tion: How do people in different countries perceive the principle of meritoc-
racy, and what is their underlying understanding of merit? At the conceptual 
level, we draw on the research on ‘moral economies’ as well as on the ‘cultural 
repertoires’ and put forward the term ‘moral repertoires’ in order to tap that 
people in different contexts can draw on different types of understandings 
and interpretations and may make different claims when it comes to the issue 
of meritocracy. Rather than finding a universal and fixed normative or judge-
mental set, we expect to find different interpretations of meritocracy, which 
are related to national and social structural contexts.
As empirical cases we investigate people’s attitudes in four selected coun-
tries, namely Germany, Norway, Slovenia and the UK, which are all developed, 
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European countries, but represent different inequality and welfare regimes. 
We combine quantitative and qualitative analyses, with quantitative data 
coming from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2016 (Round 8), and qualita-
tive data stemming from large group discussions among citizens held in the 
four countries of interest. Quantitatively, we look at support for meritocracy 
understood as a combination of talent and effort in the four countries and in 
different social groups. In the qualitative part, we probe deeper into the con-
cept of meritocracy: What kind of efforts and achievements people actually 
have in mind when referring to a just distribution of rewards and positions on 
the basis of merit? Our hunch is that we will not find a uniform understanding 
across different countries of which merits should count. With the qualitative 
data at hand, we are able to tease out more specifically which types of under-
standings, arguments and justifications – which we subsume under the label 
“moral repertoire” – do prevail in different societal contexts when people apply 
norms of meritocracy.
Our article is organized in four parts. First, we present our conceptual 
framework of moral repertoires, which draws on the literature on cultural rep-
ertoires on the one hand, and on moral economies on the other hand. Then 
we will introduce the cases, data and methods, in particular the qualitative 
data which were generated in so-called democratic forums. In the third part, 
we will present the results of our empirical analysis. On the one hand, we are 
interested in the overall levels of support for the meritocratic principle of 
rewarding talent and effort as well as group-specific item responses. On the 
other hand, we will use the qualitative data from the democratic forums to 
analyse the cultural repertoires of making sense of meritocracy and link these 
back to the different country cases. The article concludes with a discussion of 
the findings.
2 Meritocracy: Understanding Moral Repertoires
By and large, meritocracy refers to a system of stratification where there is a 
link between ‘merit’, however understood, and the distribution of social po-
sitions and resources. Two related features seem to be of prime importance 
for a meritocracy: impartial competition and equality of opportunity (Talib 
and Fitzgerald 2015). The meritocracy paradigm is closely linked to the issue 
of justice, as it provides a strong justification for unequal (i.e. non-egalitarian) 
distributions and status differentiations. It has been observed that the “merit 
principle seems to have a firm grounding in popular thinking about justice: 
it corresponds to the widespread belief that people deserve to enjoy unequal 
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incomes depending on abilities and how hard they work” (Miller 1999: 178).1 
While Michael Young (1958) considered talent and effort as the main com-
ponents of meritocracy, stratification researchers place key emphasis on the 
nexus between family background, educational achievement and income/
labour market positioning: In a meritocratic society the association between 
people’s class background and their educational attainment should be weak, 
whereas the association between people’s educational attainment and class 
position should be strong. This would be the version of an education- and 
work-based meritocracy (Goldthorpe 2003). Alternatively, meritocracy can 
also be regarded as a system of rewards for actual inputs (or individual contri-
butions) in a given context, which establishes a proportional relation between 
efforts and rewards; in addition it may also compensate for prior investment 
(e.g. in skills) (Offe 1977).
Comparative survey data has shown that in Western societies most peo-
ple attribute success to meritocratic factors, in particular to hard work (Mijs 
2018). Previous research has also demonstrated that the actual societal degree 
of meritocracy is closely linked to people’s support for the principle of meri-
tocracy (Kunovich and Slomczynski 2007). Empirically, it has also been found 
that the subjectively perceived role of effort in getting ahead in life – a core 
component of meritocracy – makes people more willing to accept inequali-
ties and restrain redistributive preferences (Piketty 1995; Corneo and Grüner 
2002). There is also evidence that higher status groups hold the strongest meri-
tocratic beliefs (Kunovich and Slomczynski 2007). At a more general level, we 
know that the distributional principles in place have a strong impact on what 
is considered to be appropriate, just or fair (Kahneman, Knetsch and Richard 
1986; Mau 2003; Kelley and Zagorski 2005; Willis et al. 2015).
Much of the research mentioned, however, rests on item-based surveys 
and thus neglects potential differences in scripts or frames of meritocracy. 
Qualitative studies on meritocracy focus primarily on specific groups or or-
ganisations of contexts, such as university admission or job promotion (for an 
overview see Chang-Hee and Yong-Beom 2017). There are only few studies at 
1 Of course, meritocracy is not uncontested: While the principle of unequal rewards for un-
equal contributions seems to be initially plausible, the bulk of literature sees meritocracy as 
a modern myth (Offe 1977; Goldthorpe 2003; Frank 2016). Not only do we face difficulties in 
measuring inequality (Itschert 2018), it is also unclear how large inequalities should be and 
what consequences (should) follow from these inequalities (Franzini, Granaglia and Raitano 
2016). Moreover, the principle of meritocracy is thwarted by other societal factors such as 
gender and ethnicity. Finally, meritocracy might be a mechanism behind the wealth of the 
rich, but it also cements the privileged position of the following generations (Josifidis and 
Supic 2017).
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hand dealing with meritocracy at large. Here it has been suggested that there 
are dominant national narratives of meritocracy, but that these narratives are 
variously negotiated and interpreted (e.g. Teo 2019). There are also hints that 
meritocratic thinking hinges upon people’s understanding on individual agen-
cy and how failure is attributed, but also how effort and merit are understood 
(Clycq, Ward Nouwen and Vandenbroucke 2014). A focus group-based study 
(Neckel, Dröge and Somm 2008) provides an interesting taxonomy of differ-
ent understandings of merit. Here it was found that people can refer to differ-
ent aspects, namely: personal traits (such as self-reliance and engagement); 
‘work’ in terms of personal efforts, time and intensity; the overall contribu-
tion to society; the product resulting from one’s efforts; or rewards allocated by 
market principles.
Meta-research has shown that the idea of meritocracy is neither univocal 
nor static, but depends largely on an agreement what merit is and how it can 
be measured or observed (Chang-Hee and Yong-Beom 2017). Moreover, it has 
also been pointed out that ideas of meritocracy are not arbitrary, but may vary 
cross-nationally, cross-culturally and with a given institutional context (ibid; 
Duru-Bellat and Tenret 2012; Park and Liu 2014). This is what drives the inter-
est of our article: How do people view and understand meritocracy, and which 
merits do they consider as legitimate and “rewardable”? What do people mean 
when they say that merit should matter and how do they see this principle 
prevailing (or lacking, or at risk) in society?
Our conceptual frame relies on different research traditions. The first is 
rooted in cultural sociology, putting forward the concept of a cultural reper-
toire which highlights that social actors actively engage with a set of elements 
available to them depending on their social environment. The concept suggests 
that there are different repertoires of understanding, framing and justifying 
forms of social order and that this sense-making contributes to the production 
and reproduction of social inequality (Lamont, Beljean and Clair 2014). The 
concept has been employed for analysing culture, class, symbolic boundaries 
and forms of exclusion (Lamont 1992, 2000; Lamont et al. 2016). With regard 
to inequality and the key role of meritocracy – understood as how individ-
uals should be rewarded and achieve their position – authors have claimed 
that cultural processes of interpretation and evaluation should matter too 
(McCall 2014).2
2 The French tradition of the “economy of conventions” makes a related argument by stating 
that (economic) actors draw on specific socio-cultural frames which provide them a shared 
interpretation of specific situations of production or distribution (see Lamont and Thévenot 
2000 for the link between both paradigms). According to their take, there exists a plurality 
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Whereas these approaches are interested in the moral grammar and cul-
tural repertoires of evaluation, parts of the contemporary research on moral 
economies3 looks at attitudes, preferences and patterns of beliefs. The moral 
economy approach is interested in the minds of the common people, in par-
ticular which distributional outcome is seen as fair and which claims one can 
justifiably make (Thompson 1971, 1991). While much work has been made on 
traditional societies, the contemporary literature scrutinizes people’s attitudes 
with regard to issues such as inequality, welfare transfers or deservingness 
(Rothstein 1998; Mau 2003; Sachweh 2012; Koos and Sachweh 2017). In a styl-
ized way one could say that the moral economy approach places stronger em-
phasis on people’s attitudinal stances and differences between different status 
groups, while the cultural repertoire perspective is more interested in the avail-
able types of arguments, understandings and justifications people deploy in a 
given social context. However, both assume that institutional arrangements 
matter: For the moral economy approach institutions have a preference- and 
attitude-forming impact on people’s moral stances, whereas cultural rep-
ertoires can be understood as tools or scripts people can activate in a given 
context. Here we deal with specific schemes of evaluation mobilized at the 
discursive or interactional level (and less with individual attitudinal stances).
In this article, we take inspiration from both, the cultural repertoire and the 
moral economy writings. By talking about the moral repertoires of meritocra-
cy, we assume, first, that there is a moral terminology of “who deserves what” 
when it comes to distributive issues, second, that moral assumptions guide 
people’s understanding of meritocracy, third, that there is a stock of cultural 
repertoires available for people’s evaluation of distributional processes and, 
fourth, that these are firmly grounded within the social structure and the in-
stitutional context. Our approach suggests that attitudes and types of moral 
reasoning are neither free-floating nor purely normative, but embedded into 
cultural scripts and institutional environments. We therefore link macro-social 
structures with cognitive and evaluative aspects. Given our topical interest, 
the issue how people view and interpret meritocracy and what merit actually 
of “orders of worth” or “types of justification” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). In contrast to 
them, we are not interested in constitutive “orders of worth” in different social arenas, but in 
the specific understanding of the meritocratic norm.
3 The moral economy approach derives from anthropological and social-historical accounts 
emphasizing that human action is not merely driven by economic interests, but also by 
moral concerns (Polanyi 1944; Thompson 1971). It often refers to traditional communities or 
peasant societies where forms of exchange are closely tied to social norms of fairness, but it 
has also been applied to modern societies, issues of inequality and the welfare state (Mau 
2003; Sachweh 2012).
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means in different social contexts gains centre stage. The aim of this article 
is to show not only how the popular principle of meritocracy is understood 
cross-nationally, but also how the institutional setting people live in and their 
group-specific position intersect. We propose that cultural repertoires of meri-
tocracy may be country-specific, but that the same type of repertoire may play 
out differently for different groups.
Our empirical section will address these issues by looking at the overall sup-
port for meritocracy first and then tapping into the different understandings of 
what merit actually is or should be – the moral repertoires.
3 Research Design: Cases, Data, Methods
3.1 Case Selection
As outlined above, we base our study on the assumption that there is a fun-
damental affinity between dominant institutional arrangements and people’s 
understanding (and problematizing) of meritocracy (Rothstein 1998; Mau 
2003; Sachweh 2012). In a way, these institutions equip people with a moral 
repertoire for reflecting on inequality, so that it seems plausible to expect cross-
national differences. Consequently, we seek to grasp the moral repertoires of 
meritocracy in four countries with diverging socio-economic and institutional 
setups: UK, Germany, Norway and Slovenia.
The UK is a liberal market economy with highly competitive market ar-
rangements (Hall and Soskice 2001) and a welfare state that emphasizes last-
resort safety, choice and individual responsibility (Bonoli 1997). It is guided by 
the idea that the market provides the best allocation principle; in a flourishing 
market social wealth is supposed to ‘trickle down’ from the rich to the poorer 
sections of the society. The liberal welfare regime rallies the slogan ‘Work, not 
welfare’ emphasizing that “people are supposed to earn their living on the la-
bour market, and public welfare programs are supposed to serve only as a re-
sidual fall-back” (Goodin 2001: 13).
In Germany, we find a relatively strong link between the education sys-
tem and labour market positions, and hence also between skill and status 
(Allmendinger 1989; Shavit and Müller 1998). This status model is also mirrored 
by the corporatist welfare regime which is firmly based on compulsory social 
insurance organisations and suggests an understanding of meritocracy where 
investments in skill, hard work and occupational positions should determine 
people’s rewards and justify inequality – while at the same time excessive in-
equalities are disliked for the sake of the unifying theme of social cohesion 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 60).
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Norway is not only a rich country with a comprehensive welfare system, it 
is also, as its Scandinavian neighbours, a comparatively equal country (Kuhnle 
2000). Norway counts as a universal welfare state where eligibility is primar-
ily based in citizenship. Also due to the redistributive capacity of the welfare 
state, it has largely succeeded in containing inequality. Norway shares with the 
other countries of the Scandinavian cluster a comparatively strong ‘passion for 
equality’. The acceptance of luck as factor determining people’s fate in life is 
relatively low (Almås, Cappelen and Tungodden 2016).
Finally, Slovenia is a post-socialist country and has been part of Yugoslavia 
till the beginning of the 1990s. It still bears the legacy of the socialist past with 
a commitment to socio-economic equality (Kornai 1992). Though achieve-
ment and merit were also part of the official doctrine as a contribution to so-
cialist development, they were linked to issues of political loyalty and hardly 
translated into strong status differentiation. Compared to other post-socialist 
countries which have experienced skyrocketing inequalities, Slovenia belongs 
to those countries that managed to keep the inequality level low (Bandelj and 
Mahutga 2010; Heyns 2005), while the level of government redistribution via 
taxes and transfers is high (OECD 2015).
When studying moral repertoires of meritocracy in these four coun-
tries, we focus on examining people’s support for the meritocratic principle 
and their framings and justifications, which we expect to differ across the dif-
ferent setups.
3.2 Data
In line with our twofold research interest – i.e., examining a) support for the 
meritocratic principle, and b) people’s understandings of merit and their jus-
tifications of related distributional practices – our methodological approach 
is based on two kinds of data: quantitative data that enable a representative 
analysis of country differences in attitudes, and qualitative data that allow us 
to detect different interpretations of the concept and norm of meritocracy.
For our analysis of the prevalence of meritocratic beliefs, we use data from 
the European Social Survey 2016 (ESS Round 8). In 2016, the ESS rotating mod-
ule focused on welfare attitudes, which are of fundamental importance to our 
study. In more detail, we use respondents’ (dis-)agreement with the statement 
“Large differences in income are acceptable to properly reward differences in 
talent and efforts”. This (dis-)agreement can be expressed on a 5-point scale 
(strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree). 
The same item was presented to the participants of the democratic forums 
(see below) in a questionnaire at the beginning of the event, thus allowing a 
comparison with the opinion patterns in the population. For our descriptive 
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ESS analysis, we recode this variable into three categories (agree, disagree, nei-
ther agree nor disagree). For our multivariate ESS analysis, we use the origi-
nal 5-point scaled variable with higher values indicating agreement to the 
statement mentioned above, i.e. stronger inequality-legitimizing meritocratic 
beliefs.4
For our analysis of people’s moral repertoires of meritocracy, we use qual-
itative data from the project “Welfare State Futures: Our Children’s Europe” 
(WelfSOC; for detailed information on the dataset, see appendix). The data 
were collected in autumn 2015 in so-called democratic forums (DF) in each 
country. These two-day discussion rounds, which were organized by nation-
al research teams with support from research institutes, assembled about 35 
citizens in each country to discuss – under light moderation – the future of 
welfare in their country (partly in plenary sessions, partly in smaller groups). 
The recruitment strategy (appendix) allows us to differentiate between partici-
pants from different social groups. We distinguish between a low status group 
and a high status group, based on a combined measure of education and in-
come (for details see appendix, Tables A2 and A3). Asking the DF participants 
to broadly discuss social inequalities and welfare allows us to examine if and 
how merit and meritocracy were brought up by the participants on their own 
and in different social contexts without prompting opinions on this topic. The 
roughly 120 hours of discussions were audio- and video-recorded, transcribed, 
translated into English and coded for this article using an analytical frame-
work that distinguishes between ‘perceptions of meritocracy as a normative 
principle’, ‘realization of the principle’ and ‘constructions of merit’, with the 
possibility of adding further categories and codes inductively.
4 Results: Patterns of Support and Understandings of Meritocracy
4.1 Patterns of Support for Meritocracy
The results of our quantitative ESS analysis show pronounced country differ-
ences with regard to inequality-legitimizing meritocratic beliefs (see Figure 1): 
While about 54 percent of British respondents and 52 percent of German re-
spondents state that large differences in income are acceptable to properly 
4 In order to deal with missing information in some of our independent variables in the ESS 
data (mainly income and education), we perform multiple imputation. Our imputation pro-
cedure follows Johnson and Young (2011) and results in 100 multiple imputed data sets. These 
combined multiple imputed data sets are the basis of our quantitative multivariate analy-
sis of the ESS. All quantitative analyses of the ESS are weighted with the post-stratification 
weight provided by the ESS.
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reward talents and efforts, this is true for only about 44 percent of Norwegian 
respondents and about 26 percent of Slovenian respondents. Additionally, the 
country differences regarding criticism of meritocratic beliefs are almost a 
mirror image of the former pattern: a majority of about 52 percent of Slovenian 
respondents do not think that large differences in income are acceptable to 
reward talents and efforts, but this opinion is held by only about 33 percent of 
respondents in Norway, about 29 percent of respondents in Germany and just 
26 percent of those in the UK. The share of respondents who do not have a 
definite view on this topic is very similar in all four countries. It varies between 
19 (Germany) and 24 percent (Norway). In sum, we find widespread inequality-
legitimizing meritocratic beliefs in the UK and in Germany, while these be-
liefs are less widespread – but still rather common – in Norway. In this latter 
country, the difference between the share of those with affirmative and those 
with critical views on meritocracy is much less pronounced than in the other 
regions under study. In Slovenia, inequality-legitimizing meritocratic beliefs 
are relatively rare. Here, a majority holds critical views instead.
In the next step, we focus on differences in meritocratic beliefs between in-
come groups and between educational groups within countries. For this, we 
estimate country-specific linear regression models.5 In these models, a respon-
5 We also estimated country-specific ordinal logistic regression models. The results of these 
models (not shown) do not differ substantially from the results presented below.
Figure 1 Large differences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts
ess 2016, weighted, own calculation
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dent’s (dis-)agreement with the statement “Large differences in income are 
acceptable to properly reward differences in talent and efforts” is the (5-point 
scaled) dependent variable with higher values indicating stronger inequality-
legitimizing meritocratic beliefs. We are mainly interested in two independent 
variables, household net income and education. Both variables are grouped 
in three categories: low, medium and high.6 In all models we control for age, 
gender and employment status (for the operationalization see Table A1 in 
the appendix).
The results of our regression analysis show significant differences between 
income groups in all countries under study (see Table 1). After controlling for 
age, gender, education and employment status, we find that people with a high 
income hold meritocratic beliefs that are on average 0.43 (UK), 0.31 (Germany), 
0.25 (Slovenia) and 0.13 (Norway) scale points stronger than those of people 
with a low income. In addition, we also find significant (but smaller) differ-
ences between those with low and those with medium income. Again, these 
differences are strongest in the UK (0.19) and weakest in Norway (0.12). We 
only observe significant differences between educational groups in one coun-
try: Norwegians with medium education hold somewhat stronger meritocratic 
beliefs than Norwegians with other educational levels. Hence, we not only find 
substantial country differences in support for the meritocratic principle, the 
level of support also differs within countries according to the respondents’ 
economic position.
These findings are important for gaining an impression of the overall pic-
ture of the prevalence of inequality-legitimizing meritocratic beliefs in differ-
ent countries, and they already point to regime differences – a fact that will be 
discussed in greater detail below. However, they provide little help in analysing 
the interpretations and reasoning that people use to make sense of the con-
cepts of meritocracy and merit. For this focus of research, item-based surveys 
are of limited use and qualitative data is necessary instead. Therefore, in the 
following subsection, we will turn to the data from the democratic forums. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the empirical pattern of support for inequality-
legitimizing meritocratic beliefs found among the participants of these demo-
cratic forums is very similar to the pattern found in the ESS: the ranking of the 
countries is identical in both data sources, and also the share of respondents 
who agree with the statement “Large differences in income are acceptable to 
properly reward differences in talent and efforts” is very similar in both data 
sources in almost all countries under study (except Slovenia). Hence, it seems 
6 In contrast to our qualitative analysis, we did not use a combined measure of income and 
education since we have enough cases to estimate the influence of income and education on 
meritocratic beliefs separately. This provides more detailed quantitative results.
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likely that the kinds of interpretative reasoning found in the qualitative sample 
to some degree also exist in the quantitative ESS sample and the general popu-
lation of the countries.
4.2 Moral Repertoires of Framing Meritocracy
4.2.1 United Kingdom (UK)
A highly salient stock of understandings among UK participants was that 
high earners had done a good job in selling their abilities and efforts on the 
Table 1 Influences on inequality-legitimizing meritocratic beliefs (unstandardized coefficients of 
country-specific linear regressions)
UK Germany Norway Slovenia
Household income
 Low income Ref. (.) Ref. (.) Ref. (.) Ref. (.)
 Medium income 0.19** (0.011) 0.16** (0.009) 0.12+ (0.089) 0.13+ (0.096)
 High income 0.43** (0.000) 0.31** (0.000) 0.13+ (0.090) 0.25** (0.008)
Education
 Low education Ref. (.) Ref. (.) Ref. (.) Ref. (.)
 Medium education 0.03 (0.701) 0.02 (0.817) 0.14+ (0.093) 0.00 (0.981)
 High education −0.09 (0.273) −0.14 (0.103) −0.10 (0.270) 0.13 (0.237)
Age
15-34 Ref. (.) Ref. (.) Ref. (.) Ref. (.)
35-59 −0.09 (0.217) 0.09 (0.152) −0.09 (0.222) −0.30** (0.000)
60+ −0.06 (0.420) 0.12+ (0.051) −0.14+ (0.057) −0.25** (0.003)
Gender
 Male Ref. (.) Ref. (.) Ref. (.) Ref. (.)
 Female −0.05 (0.361) −0.10* (0.023) −0.21** (0.000) −0.12+ (0.056)
Employment status
 In paid work Ref. (.) Ref. (.) Ref. (.) Ref. (.)
 Not in paid work −0.09 (0.197) −0.05 (0.356) 0.10 (0.171) −0.08 (0.317)
Constant 3.26** (0.000) 3.08** (0.000) 3.13** (0.000) 2.83** (0.000)
Observations 1925 2813 1534 1278
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Note: Higher values indicate stronger agreement to the statement “Large differences in income are accept-
able to properly reward differences in talent and efforts”. Robust standard errors, weighted, with imputations 
(m=100), p-values in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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labour market, which is reflected in (even very high) deserved financial re-
wards. Labour market positions and incomes were consequently understood 
as indicating individual performance and achievements within a competitive 
system, and differences in social status and earnings were not only perceived 
as acceptable but also as reasonable to mirror differences in individual perfor-
mance. In short, the market was seen as the natural measure to implement the 
meritocratic principle – and hence those with success at the (job) market were 
seen as deserving. Other criteria, such as great (physical) effort or the social 
utility of deeds, only played a very marginal role.
The assumption that meritocracy equals market success clearly served as a 
moral guide for the UK participants: the narrative of status differences as legit-
imate indicators of different market performance appeared throughout large 
parts of the discussions. Despite some critical remarks in the direction of foot-
ball players or bankers, high wages were in general seen as justifiably and fairly 
reflecting individual success (“if you perform better than the other one, you 
get more money”). Consequently, debates on income inequalities soon turned 
away from measures affecting higher income groups and focused particularly 
on the relationship between lower wages and social benefits. Here, the notion 
of ‘hard-working’ (but low-earning) individuals was created several times and 
Figure 2 Large differences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts (share of 
those who agree or strongly agree)
ess 2016, weighted, welfsoc (pre-discussion survey), unweighted, 
own calculation
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positioned against the image of – supposedly lazy – benefit recipients (“I’m 
going out there working hard and someone is just sitting there not doing any-
thing, earning more than what I’m earning in my wages, that really gets to me, 
it’s really does get to me”).
All participants seemed to agree that work must pay in the sense that so-
cial benefits should be substantially lower than wages, and in the debates they 
shared a number of salient repertoires to evaluate existing inequalities and 
distributional processes. Social benefits were not perceived as a means to buf-
fer social risks but as an obstacle to a fair implementation of the meritocratic 
principle via the market, as they create imbalances between benefit recipients 
and low earners (“If you’re below a certain income then you get boosted by 
the government”). Consequently, benefit conditionality and benefit reduction 
played a crucial role in discussions on policy measures (“It is a shame to know 
people on benefit getting more than what I earn. Tax them, tax them. […] Tax 
their benefit”).
In the discussions, the image of the ‘lazy unemployed’ and criticism of a 
dis-incentivizing benefit system were particularly stressed by participants 
who were themselves in a lower social position (“Every time you drive past 
the Jobcentre […], they are outside standing with cans of beer at 10 o’clock in 
the morning”). This might reflect attempts to distance themselves from the ‘in-
active’ population. Low earners highlighted their disadvantages compared to 
benefit recipients, and benefit recipients veiled their circumstances and made 
a great effort to distance themselves from the ‘lazy unemployed’. One partici-
pant with a lower social status described this clash very clearly: “The divide 
isn’t between the rich and the poor. I think the divide is between the working 
class and the benefits people. That’s where the divide is.”
The perception of social reality as a divide between the working class and 
welfare beneficiaries seems to be related to the perceptions of the meritocratic 
principle within lower social groups, and it is here where we can observe an 
interesting combination of shared cultural repertoires and diverging usage of 
these repertoires. The shared baseline for all participants is the narrative of 
meritocracy as an equivalent of market success. However, in contrast to par-
ticipants from higher social groups, participants from lower social groups ex-
pressed crucial doubts regarding some aspects of the implementation of the 
meritocratic principle. They do not criticize a lack of opportunities to climb 
the ladder and receive remuneration for good success on the market, but rath-
er stress the institutional obstacles to a fair reward for hard work in contrast to 
dis-incentivizing and ‘pampering’ social benefits.
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4.2.2 Germany
In contrast to the UK, the German participants did not relate meritocracy to 
market outcomes and success, but consistently understood it as reflecting 
individual work effort: deserving is who shows effort and activity. This work-
centred view of meritocracy served as a clear moral guide, was broadly shared by 
German DF participants independent of their socio-economic status, political 
preference, or migration background, and was partly accompanied by a gen-
eral glorification of work (“work is the elixir of life”).
In line with this work-centred perception of meritocracy, during the debates 
participants often tried to relate the earnings of occupational groups to their 
presumed work effort. This shared repertoire served to evaluate inequalities 
and link them to perceived violations of the meritocratic principle. The overall 
picture was that some groups – most notably managers, bankers, politicians, 
high-level officials, and professional sportspersons such as soccer players 
(“they kick a ball around … you shouldn’t be able to earn 80 million for doing 
something like that”) – were deemed as earning too much compared to their 
individual effort. This common understanding of ‘merit’ in terms of work effort 
was partly supplemented by other criteria. Most notably, participants occa-
sionally interpreted merit in terms of ‘social utility’, but usually in combina-
tion with work effort. This was especially the case for unpaid care, family and 
household work as well as for educational, medical and nursing occupations.
While the understanding of merit as work effort was shared and broadly 
supported by all social groups in the German DF, the interpretations of what 
work effort actually means differed among social groups. For example, DF par-
ticipants with a higher social status pleaded for differentiation in terms of indi-
vidual ‘performance’ and ‘achievement’ and supported performance-based pay 
(“Some people really do their best and do a great job in a position, and others 
sit there like a rock and do nothing, but at the end of the month, they get the 
same amount of money. That is a major example of inequality”). By contrast, 
participants from the low-income group interpreted work effort often in terms 
of ‘hard work’ and especially highlighted the work efforts in traditional crafts 
(“I think it’s totally unfair that the baker, who is there from 3 am and stays until 
5 pm […], they earn very little money […]. Those who achieve more should get 
more, but for those who still work hard and make something of themselves, 
they should be better supported”).
Another difference between participants with higher and lower social sta-
tus was visible regarding the importance of educational qualifications and cer-
tificates. Participants with a higher social status insisted that pay should be 
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dependent on educational qualifications (“If someone does very simple work 
and gets less money compared to someone who did a lot to get where he is 
through study and so on, that person gets more. In that sense, it’s appropriate 
that this person gets more – it should be more, because he invested more”). In 
contrast, participants with lower income argued that actual work effort should 
play a larger role (“Those with poor grades can often do a job just as well as 
someone who got all A’s in school”).
Across all social groups, and despite their general support for a work-based 
principle of meritocracy, many DF participants also raised concerns regard-
ing the realization of this principle, especially in two respects. First, almost 
all participants agreed that economic inequalities had become too large over 
the past decades (“When I think of Winterkorn, the VW manager who stepped 
down who earned 16 or 17 million in one year – that is completely out of pro-
portion with the workers who are employed there in the company and man-
ufacture the cars”). The second arena where the meritocratic principle was 
viewed to be violated by many DF participants was the welfare state. There 
was a widespread sense of unfairness and injustice regarding social policies 
in various fields, especially education, healthcare, and old-age pensions. The 
overarching notion behind this criticism seems to be that due to recent so-
cial policy reforms – which had aimed at more individual responsibility for 
private provision and had introduced basic security benefits in pensions and 
unemployment protection (Heuer and Mau 2017) – and due to privileges for 
public servants and several occupational groups, the core principle of conser-
vative-corporatist welfare states that status differences in the labour market 
should be reflected in social benefit levels had been increasingly eroded. Thus, 
many DF participants found some social group compared to which they felt 
they were being unfairly treated by the welfare state (cf. also Heuer, Mau and 
Zimmermann 2018).
4.2.3 Norway
By and large, the Norwegian participants had ambivalent attitudes towards 
meritocracy. The idea that individual effort needs to be rewarded financially 
was generally supported by most participants; however, it became clear in the 
discussions that these rewards should be kept within certain limits. These con-
cerns have been coined the egalitarian objection to meritocracy, meaning that 
overall inequality is too large and should be limited (Liu 2017). We also found 
that people emphasize a social utility perspective, i.e. individual efforts should 
contribute to society as a whole. Perceived as deserving were thus those who 
show individual efforts for the common good. Hence, the Norwegian percep-
tion of meritocracy followed a ‘common good’ logic, while market outcomes 
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and success played a subordinate role or were even regarded as morally 
reprehensible.
The debates in the democratic forum rested on the shared understanding 
that equality is a value in itself and that the state should equalize market- 
produced inequalities. Although some people defended inequalities as drivers 
of effort and productivity (“[W]e have to create inequalities in order to have 
an incitement for people to work”), these statements only referred to moder-
ate inequalities. It was not even necessary for the participants to come to an 
understanding about how to deal with large inequalities, as these were seen as 
not being part of Norwegian social reality and culture – and also should not be 
(“the consensus in Norway isn’t that of super greed and hogging”, “[S]ince the 
differences are smaller in Norway than many other places, we have to make 
some adjustments at the top and the bottom, overall, to keep the inequality 
growth at a minimum”). Hence, the debates were not about high inequalities 
but rather about the question whether any inequalities at all are positive or 
negative (“There will always be some differences, but I believe the goal for the 
future is to minimize or remove the silliest ones”).
This moral assumption on low income inequalities clearly shapes people’s 
understanding of meritocracy and is also reflected in the frequently voiced de-
mand for ‘equal pay for equal work’. Here it became clear that many DF partici-
pants perceived that wages do not reflect individual work efforts. The debates 
revealed a strongly proportional understanding of merit, where generalized 
principles should apply and equal achievements should go hand in hand with 
equal rewards. This is expressed with regard to gender inequalities, but also 
with regard to wage differences between work in the public and private sec-
tors (“When I brought up equal pay for equal work, I meant to talk about the 
private versus the public. Regardless of where you do the same job you should 
earn the same”). At the same time, particular meritocratic mechanisms were 
favoured, for instance with regard to educational achievements (“It should pay 
to get an education”) or with regard to individual effort (“Even if one works in 
the same division and does the same job, you execute it differently, some are 
slow workers, others are fast, some people don’t show up on time and such. 
Others are innovative, try to improve things. Shouldn’t they have the carrot to 
be rewarded a little higher?”).
However, although most participants agreed that educational achievements 
and individual efforts should be rewarded in some way, they only played a 
minor role in the debates. In contrast, the repertoire of the ‘common good’ 
was highlighted several times as a crucial criterion to justify merit or to criti-
cize undeserved advantages (“Those who earn a lot, many of them earn more 
than they should compared to what they do to contribute”, “[J]obs like nurses, 
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teachers, police, the ones who offer services that benefit society, can’t afford 
to live in the cities anymore”). The extent to which certain professions con-
tribute to society seemed to be highly relevant for the Norwegian participants, 
and here the indignation regarding inequalities was particularly pronounced 
(“Lawyers, brokers, they get these high wages while the majority gets medi-
um to low wages. Groups which the society really needs: Different healthcare 
workers, teachers in nursery school, primary school. […] The market forces, so 
highly regarded, don’t work in this case. The people we really need don’t get the 
wage increase you would believe they should have gotten”).
4.2.4 Slovenia
Slovenia clearly stood out among the four countries, because the meritocratic 
principle – in any form whatsoever – did not play a role in the discussions: there 
was not a single reference to the notion that individual earnings do, or should, 
reflect differences in talent, effort, performance or achievement. In fact, terms 
such as merit, performance, achievement, output, effort, contribution or tal-
ent were not used at all, or, if so, not applied to individuals but to occupational 
groups or society as a whole – and hence the concept of individual deserving-
ness did not apply. Instead, two other principles were very salient: a strong ori-
entation towards the collective, and a strong preference for equality – which 
seemed to be viewed as both contributing to the ‘common good’, but also as a 
value in itself.
The central role of the collective was illustrated by the fact that not the in-
dividual but the state or society were common starting points and main points 
of reference in the DF discussions. For example, DF participants frequently 
took a macroeconomic perspective and used arguments from demand-side 
economics to argue for certain (usually inequality-decreasing) policies such 
as raising the minimum wage or taxing wealth and luxury items (“More money 
will be spent, more will be consumed, and everyone will have enough work”). 
Slovenian DF participants also occasionally equated human society to a human 
body in which all parts fulfil a certain function for overall wellbeing (“Because 
we all work together, right. In one state, all of us are one body. And the body 
needs all the structures. All the structures need to survive, so that our little fin-
ger works normally, even the brain. And we all need that as a basis”).
This orientation towards the collective turned out as a salient shared moral 
repertoire that played a crucial role for participants’ evaluation of income and 
wealth distribution. A strong preference for low levels of inequality (“No, I do 
not agree with this system, I support, let’s call it, equal ones”) was observable 
in the Slovenian debates. Yet, while common indicators of income distribution 
suggest that Slovenia is one of the most equal countries in the OECD world, 
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the DF participants argued that society is divided “between the rich and those 
that don’t have anything”, and that “the differences between the rich and the 
poor are getting bigger and bigger”, with “the middle class […] vanishing” (“And 
if we observe it as a metaphor of a body, what would this mean for the body. 
It’s decay, right? Of the body”). More generally, people seemed to take it for 
granted that equality is desirable, and thus this served as the common point of 
reference for economic, social and political considerations.
Undermining (positive) references to the meritocratic principle was not 
only the absence of any individual ascriptions of merit, but also the shared no-
tion that wealth is the result of questionable, if not outright illegal, practices. 
DF participants argued that political and economic elites use their power to 
distribute wealth among themselves, often using corruption or theft (“There’s 
enough money, it’s just not distributed correctly. Stolen. Let them bring back 
what they’ve taken out and we’ll all live like in Switzerland, I guarantee”). 
Accordingly, when DF participants were asked to develop policy priorities re-
garding inequalities, all groups independently developed more or less the same 
priorities: raising the minimum wage; taxing wealth and luxury items; and fix-
ing a low wage ratio between the highest and the lowest earners (including 
fixed shares of groups in between). This also displays a broad distrust of market 
mechanisms and a high propensity for political planning and regulation.
This negative view of wealth and inequalities was backed up by further 
shared repertoires, namely references to the former socialist regime, which 
was deemed more cooperative and more equal (“Basically, at the time, I felt as 
a member of that team and we were fighting to be successful, because we knew 
that the differences in wages were not such, everyone contributed something 
to our work and that’s why the achievements were visible”). According to DF 
participants, back then workers were seen as a productive part of the collec-
tive, not primarily as a cost factor (“Nowadays workers in the production sector 
are no longer seen as part of the company’s staff and collective, but as a cost, 
and such thinking should be stopped. One has to work on values, human val-
ues and not the value of profit”). Accordingly, DF participants criticized capi-
talism for destroying human values such as honesty, compassion and respect 
(“I think that we shouldn’t just let this capitalist selfishness expand indefinitely 
and destroy everything that can be destroyed, but that we need to go back a bit 
to those socialist, positive, human values”).
If one tries to find small traces of ‘merit constructions’ in the DF statements, 
then education and work effort would arguably form the basis for merit. For 
instance, in debates about the minimum wage, one participant argued that 
raising the minimum wage for less-educated people would require correspond-
ing wage raises for people in higher income brackets to reflect their higher 
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education. At another point in the discussion, Slovenians were portrayed as 
hard-working, yet sheepish towards any rulers (“And I guess we are a nation 
with very low self-esteem, we consider ourselves to be second-rate people […].” 
“But we are hard working.” “We are hard-working, but …” “Hard-working, but 
also obedient like sheep, and if one decides to jump off a bridge, others will 
follow mindlessly”).
5 Discussion
This article started from the idea that what people find appropriate, fair and le-
gitimate is impregnated by the notions prevailing within their society and sta-
bilized by its institutions, and hence differs across institutional contexts. We 
have used the term moral repertoire to highlight the stock of understandings 
as well as types of reasoning and justifications people draw on when framing 
(or criticizing) meritocracy, and argued that these understandings are rooted 
in the institutional setup of welfare and (re)distribution. Understanding how 
people view and frame the principle of meritocracy can thus help to make 
sense of different patterns of (dis)affirmation. Hence, in order to contribute to 
a better understanding of the notions of meritocracy within and across differ-
ent institutional contexts, we set out to study the support for the meritocratic 
principle and which underlying moral repertoires people use when debating 
inequalities in four different countries with diverging institutional setups: UK, 
Germany, Norway and Slovenia.
Our analysis of data from the ESS 2016 showed strongest support for the 
meritocratic principle in the UK, followed by Germany, Norway and Slovenia – 
a pattern that roughly mirrors the degree of economic inequalities in these 
countries. Furthermore, in all countries we found that well-off individuals 
hold stronger meritocratic beliefs than their less affluent counterparts. This 
difference was most accentuated in the UK and least pronounced in Norway 
and Slovenia.
Our second empirical focus turned away from the support for the merito-
cratic principle towards people’s understandings of merit and their justifica-
tions – or criticism – of economic inequalities using qualitative data from 
democratic forums. Here, we found large differences in popular perceptions, 
interpretations and assessments of meritocracy, especially between – but 
partly also within – countries: in Britain, we observed a strong belief in the al-
locative mechanisms of the market; in Germany a dominant understanding of 
meritocracy was that rewards should reflect individual work effort; in Norway 
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people referred to the notion of social utility and a ‘common good’; and in 
Slovenia we found that meritocracy was a non-salient issue in the inequality 
discourse and people focused on collectivism and reducing inequality.
Most interestingly, these findings correspond with the argument that there 
is a link between institutional setups (that embody certain moral principles) 
and historical path dependencies, and people’s attitudinal stances: the strong 
market orientation in the UK links to the liberal market economy and the lib-
eral welfare state in this country, the work-centred views in Germany to the 
status-oriented conservative welfare tradition, the common-good orientation 
in Norway to an equality-oriented social democratic pattern, and the salience 
of collectivism in Slovenia to a certain post-socialist tradition. Our analytical 
and empirical focus did not allow us to examine if and how country-specific 
institutional setups do actually produce the observed country-specific notions 
towards meritocracy. Nevertheless, it is particularly noteworthy in this regard 
that the notion of ‘moral repertoires’ – combining insights from research on 
both moral economies and cultural repertoires – proved to be rather useful, 
because in the discussion people indeed seemed to rely on a common stock 
of analytical heuristics and normative criteria that did not have to be ex-
plained or justified since they formed part of a joint stock of references and 
assessments – and these seem to be linked to country-specific setups. For in-
stance, in the UK a joint repertoire by the participants was that individual 
earnings on the market reflect underlying talent or efforts, making even high 
economic inequalities legitimate, and in Norway participants kept recurring 
to equality and individual contributions to the common good as a basis for 
rewards. These repertoires served as a basis for people’s evaluation of distribu-
tional processes and the role of meritocracy in these processes.
These qualitative findings also help to make sense of the country-specific 
patterns of (dis)affirmation of meritocracy which were discussed in the first 
empirical step of this article on the basis of survey data. Here we observed 
strong support for the meritocracy-item in UK and (slightly weaker) in 
Germany – a finding that was mirrored by the debates in the two countries. 
The market-oriented understanding of meritocracy in the UK and the work-
related understanding in Germany also link well to the ‘mainstream concept’ 
of meritocracy as rewarding talents and efforts as it is also used in the ESS-
item, which might also contribute to why we find high levels of support to the 
item in these countries. This is clearly different for Norway and Slovenia: the 
dominant Norwegian understanding of meritocracy as a system to reward con-
tributions to the common good in the debates does not link to the wording in 
the ESS-question and hence fits with the only moderate support in Norway we 
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found in our quantitative analysis, and the absence of support for the merito-
cratic principle as such in Slovenia also links well to the low support in the ESS 
data for the country. In a nutshell, we can hence state that our analyses of the 
debates support our quantitative findings and help to understand the differ-
ent answer-patterns in the four countries, as we observed shared repertoires in 
each country that relate to specific understandings of meritocracy.
However, the existence of shared understandings and commonly deployed 
moral repertoires within countries does not mean that all participants in the 
discussion groups had similar attitudinal stances towards meritocracy. In con-
trast, particularly in Germany and the UK we could observe that participants 
from different social groups expressed different positions towards and percep-
tions of meritocracy and its implementation. However – and this is one of the 
core findings of our analysis – these different perceptions are still rooted in 
the same shared understandings of merit and related distributive principles. 
In other words: the country-specific shared images served as a baseline and 
provided the repertoire on which the participants drew selectively to morally 
justify their positions.
This selective access to shared repertoires was particularly visible in the 
German case, where some participants with higher formal education ex-
pressed a markedly different position towards the role of education in the con-
text of merit than other participants with lower education – but both groups 
argued on the basis of the shared concept of work effort. They agreed that in-
vested time and effort should be a crucial factor for determining merit, but the 
higher-educated group emphasized previously invested time and effort (e.g., 
during studies), while those with lower education stressed the role of current 
effort and argued that “Those with poor grades can often do a job just as well as 
someone who got all A’s in school”. In the UK, a similar pattern of selective ap-
plication of a joint moral repertoire was observable, as both higher and lower 
social groups agreed that the market should be the main source of redistribu-
tion, but they differed with regard to their sense-making of this market-based 
perception of merit: While for participants with a higher social status it was 
easy to argue that higher positions adequately reflect strong individual perfor-
mance and individual market success, participants with a lower social status 
clearly struggled to align their market-based understanding of merit with their 
own position. Consequently, a common pattern of reasoning among them was 
that the welfare state is an obstacle to a proper implementation of the meri-
tocratic principle, as it creates disincentives and imbalances between benefit 
recipients and low earners. Table 2 summarizes our findings.
564 Heuer et al.
Comparative Sociology 19 (2020) 542-584
Table 2 Summary of empirical results for a) support for the meritocratic principle in the population 
and b) the moral repertoires of meritocracy and related justifications in democratic forums
UK Germany Norway Slovenia
Patterns of 
(dis)affirmation 
in ESS 2016 to 
meritocracy- 
item
Very strong support, 
strongest among high 
income groups
Very strong support, 
strongest among 
high income  
groups
Mixed support  
and criticism,  
strongest support 
among high  
income groups
Low support,  
strongest among 




principle in  
democratic  
forum
Very high High Mixed Not salient
Understanding  








be reflected in 
remuneration
Individual work 
effort and social 
utility should be 
reflected in remu-
neration; equality 
as a crucial value
Meritocracy as 
normative principle 
not relevant (no 
individual ascrip-
tions); ruled out 









welfare system as 
obstacle to full  
realization (due  
to disincentives  
to work)
Not fully realized: 
economic in-
equalities too high; 
welfare entitle-









Even if meritocracy 
was desirable, the 
existing corruption 
and abuse of power 







Lower social  
groups emphasize 
institutional barriers  
of the welfare 
system to a proper 
implementation of the 
meritocratic principle; 
resulting in divide 
between working class 
and welfare recipients 
Different interpre-
tations of work 
effort in higher and 
lower social groups 
(achievements vs. 
hard work), and 
different views on 
the preferred role 
of educational 
qualifications
Not observed Not observed
General 
characterization
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In sum, by combining a quantitative analysis of patterns of support for mer-
itocracy with an exploratory qualitative analysis of patterns of reasoning about 
meritocracy and constructions of merit, this article offers new insights for re-
search on meritocracy: First, we show that moral repertoires for making sense 
of meritocracy differ markedly across the four countries under study, which 
points to the need for developing more fine-grained analytical tools to study 
understandings of merit and framings of meritocracy. Second, by employing 
the concept of moral repertoires we are able to account for the observation 
that there seems to be a joint stock of understandings of meritocracy, but that 
different social groups make different uses of this joint stock, related to their 
position in the inequality and welfare regime. And third, we are able to show 
that not only the construction of merit itself has an impact on assessments 
of meritocracy, but also perceptions of the realization of meritocracy and its 
causes, which points to the need to take these perceived realizations of meri-
tocracy into account. The main limitation of our study design – which does 
not allow us to examine if and how country-specific institutional setups do 
actually produce the observed distinct constructions of merit and perceptions 
of meritocracy – is a case in point for spelling out the concept of moral reper-
toires of meritocracy in more detail in future research. We hence hope that our 
study offers fruitful insights for scholars working on social inequalities, welfare 
states, and cultural sociology.
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Appendix: Extended Information on Methods and Data Collection
Operationalization and Summary Statistics of the Quantitative 
Analysis
Table A1 Operationalization and summary statistics of the ESS sample (unweighted, with imputed 
data)
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570 Heuer et al.
Comparative Sociology 19 (2020) 542-584















































In paid work: 1









Table A1 Operationalization and summary statistics of the ESS sample (cont.)
Data Gathering for the Qualitative Analysis
The data analysed in the article was gathered in the context of the NORFACE-funded 
project “Welfare State Futures: Our Children’s Europe” (WelfSOC), which used in-
novative qualitative methods to examine citizens’ attitudes towards the welfare 
state, particularly their aspirations for the future of the welfare state in their coun-
try (blogs.kent.ac.uk/welfsoc). Under the lead of the coordinator Peter Taylor-Gooby 
(University of Kent), national teams in five European countries (Denmark, Germany, 
Norway, Slovenia, UK)7 conducted large group discussions in each country: so called 
Deliberative Forums (DF). Based on the agreed structure and in close cooperation with 
the national research teams, professional research agencies organised the recruitment, 
7 For the article, four countries representing different political economies and welfare state 
regimes were included in the analysis (Germany, Norway, Slovenia, UK), whereas the other 
Scandinavian country (Denmark) was excluded.
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organised the events, moderated the discussions and provided audio- and video re-
cording as well as transcripts and English translations of all group discussions.
The DFs took place in November 2015 in Berlin (Germany), Oslo (Norway), Ljubljana 
(Slovenia) and Birmingham (UK) for two full Saturdays8 and were organised by the 
research agencies IPSOS (Germany), Kantar TNS (Norway), Aragon (Slovenia), and 
TNS BMRB (UK). In Germany, the DF took place in the facilities of the Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin, in Slovenia in the ‘M hotel’, in Norway at the Norwegian Institute 
for Social Research, and in the UK in the ‘Campanile Hotel’. The recruitment was or-
ganised by the research agencies, using professional recruitment databases. The par-
ticipants received a financial incentive after the event. Participants had been recruited 
with the aim to assemble a ‘mini-public’ roughly representative of the population of 
the respective countries, with recruitments criteria being based on gender, age, edu-
cational qualification, employment status, family status, children in the household, 
household net income, migration background, and political orientation (see list of 
participants below). In Germany, 34 people participated in the DF, in Slovenia 37, in 
Norway 34 (32 on day two), in the UK 34.
The structure of the DF was the same in all countries. When participants arrived at 
the venue on day 1, they were welcomed and given a survey questionnaire with socio-
demographic questions and items from the European Social Survey welfare attitudes 
module (ESS Round 4, 2008) as well as items from the International Survey Social 
Programme (ISSP) and by the WelfSOC co-ordination team (e.g. on parental leave). A 
morning plenary session followed with a brief introduction to the format and the topic, 
and a brainstorming on associations that participants have when they hear the word 
‘welfare state’, and what they considered relevant for discussion in the DF. Moderators 
and researchers grouped the topics during a short break and distilled overall topics on 
which participants could then vote. The five most prominent topics were selected for 
further discussion on day 1. In Slovenia, these were health, employment, education 
and early education, elderly care, and values, rights and duties. In Germany, partici-
pants had selected the topics inequality and basic social security, labour markets and 
employment, families, retirement and intergenerational issues, health care, and im-
migration and refugees. In Norway, the topics included work/employment, education, 
financing, health as well as environment. In the UK, the five selected themes were im-
migration, welfare state financing, unemployment, overcrowding/ageing population, 
lack of/access to education. The selected topics were then discussed in three breakout 
groups per country (11-14 participants per breakout-group).
In all countries, each of the three breakout groups was formed around a ‘core 
group’ consisting of people from a specific socio-demographic group, while the other 
8 November 7th and 21st in Berlin, October 24th and November 7th in Oslo, November 14th and 
28th in Ljubljana, and October 17th and 31st in Birmingham.
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participants were allocated to the three breakouts randomly but with an eye towards 
creating a broad mixture of persons regarding age, gender, educational qualifications 
etc. The three ‘core groups’ were: 1) self-employed persons, 2) persons from ethnic mi-
norities, and 3) unemployed persons or persons in precarious employment. During 
the DF, groups were only referred to by a randomly assigned colour and participants 
seemed not to be aware of the allocation criteria.
During day 1, the participants discussed in the breakout-groups the five selected 
topics, with only loose moderation by professional moderators from the research agen-
cies. There were no prompts by moderators regarding inequality or meritocracy (nor 
any other topic), so moderators only picked up participants’ statements. Members of 
the research teams were present in the rooms but did not intervene. In the afternoon, 
all participants came back to a plenary session where they exchanged views and dis-
cussed the in their group’s eyes most important topics.
Between day 1 and day 2, the recruitment agencies sent the participants a document 
with background information (‘expert input’) from the research teams. This informa-
tion was explicitly focussing on five topics that had been selected by all WelfSOC re-
searchers in advance, in order to have the same topics for discussion on day 2 in all five 
countries. These topics were: work and occupation, inequalities, immigration, gender 
equality, and intergenerational equality. Day 2 started with a plenary session and an 
expert presentation by members of the research teams, followed by a Q&A session. 
Afterwards, participants again gathered in the same breakout-groups and discussed 
the five topics selected for day 2. The groups were asked to formulate a few policy 
guidelines for each of the five topics that should be brought to the plenary session at 
the end of day 2. In this plenary session, the policy guidelines were briefly presented 
and then participants could vote on them. At the end of day 2, the participants were 
asked to fill in again the same survey-questionnaire as in the beginning of day 1.
Data Processing
Status Group Assignment in the Qualitative Sample
For the purpose of the analysis in the present article, the participants in the four 
countries were assigned to two status group (low and high), based on the informa-
tion on their educational level and income. In a first step, all education and income 
levels in the four countries were classified as either low, medium or high. Here, also 
country-specific particularities of the education system and income distribution were 
taken into account (Table A2). This classification served as a basis for assigning the 
participants to either the low or the high status group in a second step. Participants 
with a low income and low or medium education, or a low education and a low or 
medium income were assigned to the low status group, while participants with either 
high income or high education (or both high) were assigned to the high status group 
(Table A3).
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Table A2 Classification of household’s net income and education in the qualitative sample
Germany UK Norway Slovenia
Education Income Education Income Education Income Education Income
Low Below A 
levels




































Table A3 Status groups in the qualitative sample (operationalization and number of cases)
GER[a] UK NO SI
Low status group
– low income + low education
– low income + medium education
– low education + medium income
10 12 11 13
High status group
– high income + any education
– high education + any income
24 22 23 25
[a] In Germany, two participants were manually assigned to the low status group based on
occupation and qualitative evaluation
Coding Process of Qualitative Data
For the qualitative analysis of citizens’ understandings and assessments of meritoc-
racy, a Qualitative Content Analysis on the full material of the DF in the four coun-
tries (i.e., transcripts of roughly 120 hours of discussions in both plenary sessions and 
smaller groups) was conducted that combined deductive/a-priori with inductive cat-
egories/codes. The basic analytical framework was derived from the research question, 
thus distinguishing between three issues: 1) perceptions of meritocracy as a normative 
principle, 2) realization of this principle, and 3) constructions of merit.
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The first two issues are closely related to one another, as they focus on how people 
assess the principle of meritocracy normatively (i.e. favourable or critical), and what 
this means for how they judge the practical realization of this principle in their coun-
try. The first aspect is directly connected to the statistical analysis of the ESS survey 
item, and the focus was here on three aspects: a) how people generally judge or evalu-
ate meritocracy (e.g. positively/favourably, negatively/critically) and what reasons 
they give for their judgments, b) how people understand and judge the link between 
inequality and meritocracy (e.g. how large inequalities in social positions and income 
differentials should be in relation to different inputs such as talent or effort), and c) 
in which social areas (e.g. income, health, politics etc.) people see meritocracy as par-
ticularly reasonable or problematic. The second issue was based on the finding from 
the literature that even if people have a positive notion of meritocracy as a norma-
tive principle, they are often sceptical about the realization of this principle, and they 
offer various reasons for why they see this principle as not being sufficiently realized 
in their country. For the third issue, a-priori categories were derived from the theoreti-
cal and empirical literature on ‘constructions of merit’, which resulted initially in five 
domains – work effort, education/qualifications, compensation/pay, social utility, and 
self-realization – and two basic approaches for the translation of merits into rewards: 
a) outcome-oriented, i.e. rewards automatically reflect merits; and b) process-orient-
ed, i.e., rewards do not necessarily reflect merits.
With this basic categorical framework, roughly 30% of the material in each of the 
four countries was coded, and additional codes were created inductively to add new 
aspects or to specify existing ones. This was done by two persons, who afterwards re-
viewed their allocating of codes and their creation of new codes in order to create a 
final coding scheme, which was then applied in a second round of coding to the whole 
material (also to those parts that had been coded before). For all categories/codes, ex-
plicit definitions, anchor examples, and coding rules were specified to increase inter-
coder reliability. In a third step, the codes and the underlying text were analysed by 
the research team via a comparison and contrasting of codes and statements among 
different countries, status groups and individual participants.
List of DF-Participants
Note: there are minor variations in the data gathered in each country, according to 
national research practice.
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Table A4 Participants in Germany
Participant 
number
Vote for  
party in  
next  
election
Gender Age Highest level  
of education






P01 SPD Female 45-54 Tertiary Unemployed, 
looking for job
<1400 €  
(1 + 2 Decile)
No 




1400-2100 €  
(3 + 4 Decile)
No 
P03 SPD +  
Grüne
Female Under 24 Upper 
secondary 
In full-time <1400 €  
(1 + 2 Decile)
Yes
P04 Piraten Female 45-54 Tertiary Working full 
time
2800-4000 €  
(7 + 8 Decile)
No 
P05 Grüne Female 45-54 Tertiary Working full 
time
2100-2800 €  
(5 + 6 Decile)
Yes




2800-4000 €  
(7 + 8 Decile)
Yes
P07 Linke + 
Grüne
Female 45-54 Tertiary Working full 
time
2100-2800 €  
(5 + 6 Decile)
No 




1400-2100 €  
(3 + 4 Decile)
Yes
P09 SPD Female 25-34 Tertiary Unemployed, 
looking for job
1400-2100 €  
(3 + 4 Decile)
No 
P10 SPD Female 55-64 Lower 
secondary 
Retired 1400-2100 €  
(3 + 4 Decile)
No 
P11 CDU Female 65+ Tertiary Retired 2100-2800 €  
(5 + 6 Decile)
No 
P12 CDU Female 25-34 Upper 
secondary 
Stay at home  
to look after 
family
2100-2800 €  
(5 + 6 Decile)
No 




<1400 €  
(1 + 2 Decile)
Yes




4000-5000 €  
(9 Decile)
No 
P15 CDU Female 45-54 Lower 
secondary 
Stay at home  
to look after 
family
2100-2800 €  
(5 + 6 Decile)
No 
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Participant 
number
Vote for  
party in  
next  
election
Gender Age Highest level  
of education






P16 CDU Female Under 24 Upper 
secondary 
In full-time 2100-2800 €  
(5 + 6 Decile)
No 
P17 SPD Female 65+ Tertiary Retired 2800-4000 €  
(7 + 8 Decile)
No 




<1400 €  
(1 + 2 Decile)
No 




1400-2100 €  
(3 + 4 Decile)
Yes
P20 SPD Male 25-34 Tertiary Working full 
time
2100-2800 €  
(5 + 6 Decile)
No 




2800-4000 €  
(7 + 8 Decile)
Yes




2100-2800 €  
(5 + 6 Decile)
Yes
P23 SPD Male 65+ Lower 
secondary 
Retired 2100-2800 €  
(5 + 6 Decile)
No 
P24 SPD Male 55-64 Tertiary Working full 
time
4000-5000 €  
(9 Decile)
No 




4000-5000 €  
(9 Decile)
No 
P27 FDP Male 65+ Tertiary Retired >5000 € 
(10 Decile)
No 
P28 CDU Male 65+ Lower 
secondary 
Retired 2100-2800 € (5 
+ 6 Decile)
No 









4000-5000 €  
(9 Decile)
No 







P32 CDU Male 65+ Tertiary Retired 2800-4000 €  
(7 + 8 Decile)
No 
Table A4 Participants in Germany (cont.)
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Participant 
number
Vote for  
party in  
next  
election
Gender Age Highest level  
of education










<1400 €  
(1 + 2 Decile)
No 
P34 Grüne Male 45-54 Tertiary Working full 
time
2800-4000 €  
(7 + 8 Decile)
No 







Table A5 Participants in Norway
Reference Vote for  
party  
in next  
election
Gender Age Highest  
level of 
education






No-01 Labour Female Under 24 Tertiary In full-time No answer No





Female 25-34 Tertiary Working full time No answer No 
answer
No-04 Red Party Female 25-34 Tertiary Working full time F – 5th 
decile
No
No-05 Labour Female 35-44 Upper 
secondary 
Working full time C – 3rd 
decile
Yes















Male 25-34 Tertiary Working full time H – 10th 
decile
No





Male 25-34 Tertiary Working full time P – 8th 
decile
No
Table A4 Participants in Germany (cont.)
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Reference Vote for  
party  
in next  
election
Gender Age Highest  
level of 
education






No-12 Labour Female 25-34 Tertiary Working part time R – 2nd 
decile
Yes





Female 45-54 Tertiary Working full time P – 8th 
decile
No
No-15 Centre Party Female 35-44 Tertiary Permanently sick 
or disabled
R – 2nd 
decile
No
No-16 Labour Female 45-54 Tertiary Working part time P – 8th 
decile
No
No-17 Liberal Party Male Under 24 Upper 
secondary 
In full-time J – 1st decile Yes
No-18 Labour Male 25-34 Upper 
secondary 





Female 35-44 Tertiary Stay at home to 
look after house/ 
family
S – 6th 
decile
Yes










Male 55-64 Tertiary Working full time D – 9th 
decile
No





Male 25-34 Tertiary In full-time R – 2nd 
decile
No





Female 45-54 Tertiary Permanently sick 
or disabled
F – 5th 
decile
No
No-27 Red Party Female 35-44 Tertiary Unemployed, 
looking for job
C – 3rd 
decile
No
No-28 Labour Female 45-54 Tertiary Working full time H – 10th 
decile
No
Table A5 Participants in Norway (cont.)
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Reference Vote for  
party  
in next  
election
Gender Age Highest  
level of 
education






No-29 Labour Female 45-54 Tertiary Working full time M – 4th 
decile
No
No-30 Labour Female 65+ Tertiary Retired D – 9th 
decile
No
No-31 Socialist Left Female 65+ Tertiary Retired S – 6th 
decile
No
No-32 Labour Male 55-64 Primary Permanently sick 
or disabled
R – 2nd 
decile
No





Male 65+ Tertiary Retired P – 8th 
decile
No
Table A6 Participants in Slovenia
Reference Political 
orientation
Gender Age Highest  
level of  
education
Work status Number  
of children 








Sl-50 Middle Male 35-44 Tertiary Working full 
time
2 P – 8th 
decile
No
Sl-51 Middle Male 25-34 Secondary Unemployed 0 S – 6th 
decile
No
Sl-52 I don’t  
care about 
politics
Male 35-44 Secondary Unemployed 3 or more R – 2nd 
decile
No
Sl-53 Right Female 55-64 Secondary Unemployed No answer No answer No
Sl-54 Right Female 45-54 Secondary Retired 0 S – 6th 
decile
No
Sl-55 Left Male 35-44 Secondary Working full 
time
1 P – 8th 
decile
No
Sl-56 Middle Male 65+ Secondary Retired 2 D – 9th 
decile
No
Table A5 Participants in Norway (cont.)
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Reference Political 
orientation
Gender Age Highest  
level of  
education
Work status Number  
of children 








Sl-57 Middle Female 35-44 Tertiary Working full 
time
0 M – 4th 
decile
No
Sl-58 Left Female 45-54 Secondary Working full 
time
0 K – 7th 
decile
No
Sl-59 Middle Female 25-34 Tertiary Unemployed 0 R – 2nd 
decile
No
Sl-60 Left Female 35-44 Tertiary Working part 
time
0 No answer No
Sl-61 Middle Female 45-54 Secondary Working full 
time
0 C – 3rd 
decile
No
Sl-62 Middle Male 35-44 Tertiary Working full 
time
2 D – 9th 
decile
No
Sl-63 Don’t know Female 35-44 Secondary Working full 
time
2 K – 7th 
decile
No
Sl-64 Middle Male 65+ Secondary Retired 0 K – 7th 
decile
Yes
Sl-65 Right Male 25-34 Tertiary Working full 
time
2 K – 7th 
decile
No
Sl-66 Middle Female Under 
24
Secondary In full-time 0 P – 8th 
decile
No
Sl-67 Right Male 65+ Tertiary Retired 0 K – 7th 
decile
No
Sl-68 Left Female 45-54 Tertiary Working full 
time
0 S – 6th 
decile
No
Sl-69 Middle Male 35-44 Tertiary Working full 
time
2 K – 7th 
decile
No
Sl-70 Left Female 25-34 Tertiary Working full 
time
0 D – 9th 
decile
No
Sl-71 Left Female 35-44 Tertiary Working full 
time
0 H – 10th 
decile
No
Sl-72 Middle Male 55-64 Secondary Working full 
time
0 C – 3rd 
decile
No
Table A6 Participants in Slovenia (cont.)
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Reference Political 
orientation
Gender Age Highest  
level of  
education
Work status Number  
of children 








Sl-73 Don’t  
know
Female 45-54 Tertiary Working full 
time
0 R – 2nd 
decile
No
Sl-74 Middle Female 35-44 Tertiary Working full 
time
0 H – 10th 
decile
No
Sl-75 Left Male 35-44 Tertiary Working full 
time
0 D – 9th 
decile
No
Sl-76 Middle Male 35-44 Tertiary Working full 
time
0 D – 9th 
decile
No
Sl-77 Middle Female 35-44 Tertiary Working part 
time
3 or more P – 8th 
decile
No
Sl-78 Middle Male 45-54 Secondary Working full 
time
3 or more C – 3rd 
decile
No
Sl-80 Don’t know Male 65+ Secondary Retired 0 C – 3rd 
decile
No
Sl-81 Right Female 55-64 Secondary Retired 0 F – 5th 
decile
No
Sl-82 Middle Female 35-44 Secondary Working full 
time
2 P – 8th 
decile
No
Sl-83 Middle Male 45-54 Tertiary Working full 
time
1 D – 9th 
decile
No
Sl-84 Left Female 35-44 Tertiary Working part 
time
2 K – 7th 
decile
No
Sl-85 Right Male 35-44 Tertiary Working full 
time
2 F – 5th 
decile
No
Sl-86 Left Female 25-34 Tertiary Working full 
time
0 K – 7th 
decile
No
Sl-87 Middle Male 45-54 Tertiary Retired 0 J – 1st decile No
Sl-88 Left Female 45-54 Tertiary Working full 
time
2 P – 8th 
decile
No
Table A6 Participants in Slovenia (cont.)
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Table A7 Participants in the UK
Reference Vote for  
party  
in next  
election
Gender Age Highest level  
of education






UK-40 No Answer Female 25-34 Tertiary Working full 
time
M – 4th 
decile
Yes




S – 6th 
decile
No
UK-42 Labour Female 25-34 Lower 
secondary 
Stay at home 
to look after 
house/ family
R – 2nd 
decile
Yes
UK-43 Labour Male Under 24 Upper 
secondary 
In full-time K – 7th 
decile
No




D – 9th 
decile
No
UK-45 Don’t Know Female 65+ Upper 
secondary 
Retired M – 4th 
decile
No




M – 4th 
decile
No
UK-47 Don’t Know Female 65+ Upper 
secondary 
Retired J – 1st decile No




C – 3rd 
decile
Yes




J – 1st decile Yes
UK-51 UKIP Female Under 24 Lower 
secondary
Stay at home 
to look after 
house/ family
S – 6th 
decile
No




J – 1st decile Yes




M – 4th 
decile
Yes
UK-62 Labour Male 25-34 Tertiary Working full 
time
D – 9th 
decile
Yes
UK-63 Conservative Female Under 24 Upper 
secondary 
In full-time Unassigned No
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Reference Vote for  
party  
in next  
election
Gender Age Highest level  
of education






UK-64 Lib Dems Male 25-34 Tertiary Working full 
time
P – 8th 
decile
No
UK-65 Don’t Know Female 11 Tertiary Working full 
time
P – 8th 
decile
Yes
UK-66 Labour Male 45-54 Tertiary Working full 
time
H – 10th 
decile
Yes
UK-67 Labour Male 25-34 Tertiary Working full 
time
P – 8th 
decile
No




F – 5th 
decile
Yes
UK-69 Labour Male 25-34 Tertiary Working full 
time
D – 9th 
decile
No




D – 9th 
decile
Yes
UK-71 Don’t Know Female 25-34 Tertiary Working full 
time
P – 8th 
decile
Yes




R – 2nd 
decile
No
UK-81 Don’t Know Female Under 24 Tertiary Working full 
time
D – 9th 
decile
No




H – 10th 
decile
No
UK-83 Don’t Know Female 45-54 Tertiary Working part 
time
S – 6th 
decile
No




P – 8th 
decile
No
UK-85 Conservative Male 65+ Lower 
secondary
Retired J – 1st  
decile
No




D – 9th 
decile
No
Table A7 Participants in the UK (cont.)
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Reference Vote for  
party  
in next  
election
Gender Age Highest level  
of education






UK-87 Conservative Female 65+ Tertiary Retired S – 6th 
decile
No




H – 10th 
decile
Yes
UK-89 Labour Male 45-54 Tertiary Working  
full time
K – 7th 
decile
No




F – 5th 
decile
Yes
Note: lower secondary education = ISCED 2; Upper secondary education = ISCED 3, 4.
Table A7 Participants in the UK (cont.)
